A gap need not be permanent
Physicalists may accept that current concepts fail to capture experience while denying that consciousness is irreducibly non-physical.
Contemporary philosophy · 1937–
Nagel makes the first-person point of view philosophically unavoidable, asking what an objective account leaves out when there is something it is like to be a subject.

Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher whose work ranges across consciousness, ethics, political theory, death and the possibility of an objective standpoint. His bat argument became a central challenge to reductive physical accounts of experience.
The question he enters
Could a complete objective science of a bat still leave out what the bat's world is like for the bat?
The central move
Nagel argues that conscious experience has an essentially subjective character. More objective knowledge can strip away features tied to a particular standpoint, but in the case of consciousness the standpoint is part of what must be explained rather than merely a distortion to be removed.
Key ideas
Where the view strains
Physicalists may accept that current concepts fail to capture experience while denying that consciousness is irreducibly non-physical.
If a point of view is inaccessible in principle, it becomes difficult to say what evidence could support claims about another creature's experience.
Sources and routes
Primary texts
On this site