Contemporary philosophy · 1937–

Nagel

Nagel makes the first-person point of view philosophically unavoidable, asking what an objective account leaves out when there is something it is like to be a subject.

Nagel in a shaded warm-grey editorial portrait, looking upward with a small muted-gold bat brooch.

Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher whose work ranges across consciousness, ethics, political theory, death and the possibility of an objective standpoint. His bat argument became a central challenge to reductive physical accounts of experience.

MindKnowledgeEthics

The question he enters

The question Nagel enters

Could a complete objective science of a bat still leave out what the bat's world is like for the bat?
Philosophy of mindPhilosophy of mindThe study of consciousness, mental states and their relationship to bodies and the physical world.EthicsEthicsThe branch of philosophy that studies right action, good character and how life ought to be lived.Political philosophyPolitical philosophyThe study of justice, authority, rights, freedom and the proper organisation of political life.

The central move

Do not erase the point of view

Nagel argues that conscious experience has an essentially subjective character. More objective knowledge can strip away features tied to a particular standpoint, but in the case of consciousness the standpoint is part of what must be explained rather than merely a distortion to be removed.

Key ideas

Terms that carry the argument.

What it is like
The subjective character present when there is something it feels like for an organism to have an experience.
Subjective point of view
The perspective belonging to a conscious subject that cannot simply be replaced by third-person description.
View from nowhere
The aspiration to move beyond a personal standpoint towards increasing objectivity while recognising its limits.
Moral luck
The problem that moral judgement depends on outcomes and circumstances beyond an agent's control.

Where the view strains

Objections and limits.

A gap need not be permanent

Physicalists may accept that current concepts fail to capture experience while denying that consciousness is irreducibly non-physical.

Subjectivity can become insulated

If a point of view is inaccessible in principle, it becomes difficult to say what evidence could support claims about another creature's experience.

Sources and routes

Read the work. Follow the argument.

Philosopher Compendium

Agreement is a poor substitute for understanding the move.

Philosophy Lab