Agents can be opaque to themselves
Self-deception, habit and unconscious motivation challenge the claim that practical knowledge authoritatively tracks what an agent is doing.
Twentieth-century philosophy · 1919–2001
Anscombe rebuilds moral philosophy from a careful account of intentional action, refusing to treat intention as a private item hidden behind behaviour.

Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe was a British philosopher whose work transformed action theory, ethics and the interpretation of Wittgenstein. A forceful Catholic thinker and public controversialist, she analysed intention while attacking modern moral theories that use obligation language without its older framework.
The question she enters
Under which description is the same bodily movement intentional—moving an arm, pumping water, poisoning a household or earning wages?
The central move
Anscombe argues that intentional action is identified through a distinctive form of practical knowledge and through the question 'Why?'. One event can fall under many descriptions, only some of them intentional. Intention is therefore neither a private accompanying feeling nor merely a prediction of what the body will do.
Key ideas
Where the view strains
Self-deception, habit and unconscious motivation challenge the claim that practical knowledge authoritatively tracks what an agent is doing.
Rejecting consequentialism and modern obligation language still leaves disagreement about the virtues, natural law and justified action.
Sources and routes
Primary texts