Possibility answers only the logical problem
Showing consistency does not explain the actual quantity, intensity or apparently pointless distribution of suffering.
Contemporary philosophy · 1932–
Alvin Plantinga
Plantinga argues that rational belief need not always rest on argument and that the logical problem of evil fails if free creatures might go wrong in every feasible world.
Alvin Plantinga is an American philosopher whose work helped revive analytic philosophy of religion. He has made influential contributions to modal logic, the ontological argument, the problem of evil, epistemic warrant and the rational status of Christian belief.
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The question he enters
The question Alvin Plantinga enters
Could belief in God be rationally basic, more like memory or perception than the conclusion of an argument?
The central move
Separate a defence from a theodicy
Against the logical problem of evil, Plantinga need not explain God's actual reason for permitting suffering. He aims only to show a possible consistent story: significant freedom may include the possibility of wrongdoing, and it may not have been feasible for God to create free creatures who always choose well.
Key ideas
Terms that carry the argument.
- Free-will defence
- A possible account showing that divine goodness and power can be logically consistent with moral evil.
- Transworld depravity
- The possibility that every significantly free creature would go wrong in at least one respect in any feasible world where they are created.
- Properly basic belief
- A rational belief not inferred from other propositions, though still open to challenge and defeat.
- Warrant and proper function
- Knowledge-producing belief arises from truth-aimed cognitive faculties functioning properly in a suitable environment according to a good design plan.
Where the view strains
Objections and limits.
Basic belief faces plural rivals
Different religious communities can claim properly basic beliefs, raising questions about disagreement, defeaters and truth-sensitive discrimination.
Sources and routes
Read the work. Follow the argument.
Primary texts
Where to meet the position.
- EerdmansGod, Freedom, and EvilWebThe free-will defence and a modal version of the ontological argument.William B. Eerdmans paperback edition, ISBN 9780802817310. · Publisher description, bibliographic record and purchase route. Checked Aug 2026.
- Oxford AcademicThe Nature of NecessityWebPossible worlds, modality, essence and the metaphysical framework behind several theistic arguments.Oxford Academic record for the Oxford University Press edition, with bibliographic details, contents and chapter abstracts. · Publisher record and chapter-level preview; complete access may require purchase or an institutional subscription. Checked Aug 2026.
- Oxford AcademicWarranted Christian BeliefWebA model of how Christian belief could possess warrant if true.Oxford Academic record for the Oxford University Press edition, with bibliographic details, contents and chapter abstracts. · Publisher record and chapter-level preview; complete access may require purchase or an institutional subscription. Checked Aug 2026.
- Oxford AcademicWarrant and Proper FunctionWebThe proper-function account of warrant and knowledge.Oxford Academic record for the Oxford University Press edition, with bibliographic details, contents and chapter abstracts. · Publisher record and chapter-level preview; complete access may require purchase or an institutional subscription. Checked Aug 2026.
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