Twentieth-century philosophy · 1917–1981

Mackie

Mackie argues that ordinary moral claims purport to report objective requirements, but that no such requirements exist.

Mackie in a shaded warm-grey editorial portrait, turning one palm upward beneath a compact muted-gold bow tie.

John Leslie Mackie was an Australian philosopher who worked in metaethics, philosophy of religion, causation and personal identity. He is best known for moral error theory and for presenting the logical problem of evil as a challenge to traditional theism.

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The question he enters

The question Mackie enters

What if moral judgements aim at objective truth but the world contains no objective moral properties for them to describe?
Moral error theoryMoral error theoryThe view that moral judgements aim at objective truths but are systematically false because no such moral facts exist.Analytic philosophyAnalytic philosophyA tradition that emphasises clear argument, careful distinctions and the analysis of language or concepts.Philosophy of religionPhilosophy of religionThe rational study of religious concepts, arguments, experiences and practices.

The central move

Take moral language seriously, then deny its objects

Mackie does not treat ordinary moral claims as mere expressions of feeling. They present actions as objectively required or forbidden. His error theory says this claim to objective prescriptivity is systematically false, supported by disagreement and by the metaphysical strangeness that objective values would require.

Key ideas

Terms that carry the argument.

Error theory
Ordinary moral judgements make truth-apt claims, but those claims are uniformly false because objective values do not exist.
Argument from relativity
Persistent moral disagreement is better explained by different ways of life than by perception of one objective moral realm.
Argument from queerness
Objective values would be metaphysically and epistemically unlike ordinary natural facts because they would intrinsically prescribe action.
Logical problem of evil
The claim that traditional divine attributes and the existence of evil appear inconsistent without adequate additional premises.

Where the view strains

Objections and limits.

Disagreement does not prove error

Disagreement occurs in science and history too, so moral variation alone may not undermine objective truth.

Normative facts need not be queer

Moral realists argue that reasons and values can be objective without exerting mysterious causal or motivational force.

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Agreement is a poor substitute for understanding the move.

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