Disagreement does not prove error
Disagreement occurs in science and history too, so moral variation alone may not undermine objective truth.
Twentieth-century philosophy · 1917–1981
Mackie argues that ordinary moral claims purport to report objective requirements, but that no such requirements exist.

John Leslie Mackie was an Australian philosopher who worked in metaethics, philosophy of religion, causation and personal identity. He is best known for moral error theory and for presenting the logical problem of evil as a challenge to traditional theism.
The question he enters
What if moral judgements aim at objective truth but the world contains no objective moral properties for them to describe?
The central move
Mackie does not treat ordinary moral claims as mere expressions of feeling. They present actions as objectively required or forbidden. His error theory says this claim to objective prescriptivity is systematically false, supported by disagreement and by the metaphysical strangeness that objective values would require.
Key ideas
Where the view strains
Disagreement occurs in science and history too, so moral variation alone may not undermine objective truth.
Moral realists argue that reasons and values can be objective without exerting mysterious causal or motivational force.
Sources and routes
Primary texts
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