Can natural habit count as justification?
Explaining why people expect the future to resemble the past does not by itself show that the expectation is rationally warranted.
Early modern philosophy · 1711–1776
Hume asks human reason to account for its habits, showing how causation, self and morality depend on practices that argument alone cannot manufacture.

David Hume was a Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, historian and essayist. His empiricism and scepticism reshaped debates about causation, personal identity, religion and the sources of moral judgement.
The question he enters
How much of what you call knowledge is a rational proof—and how much is a well-trained expectation?
The central move
Hume distinguishes relations of ideas from matters of fact and asks what experience could justify our concepts. We observe one event followed by another, not a necessary connection floating between them. Custom carries expectation forward. His scepticism is therefore both disruptive and naturalistic: humans keep reasoning, but with less metaphysical swagger.
Key ideas
Where the view strains
Explaining why people expect the future to resemble the past does not by itself show that the expectation is rationally warranted.
An appeal to common feeling must explain prejudice, disagreement and the social training of sympathy.
Sources and routes
Primary texts
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