Epistemology

Can we be certain of anything?

The problem in miniature

The room that was not there

You wake in your room, read a message, feel the cold floor, and begin an ordinary day. Hours later, you discover that every sensation was produced by a perfect simulation. Nothing felt strange, not even for a moment, and no test available from within the experience could expose it. At the time, you were completely certain that you were awake. You were wrong. Yet the experience was indistinguishable from one you normally trust. The case separates how secure a belief feels from what makes it knowledge.

Why this is difficult

The pressure comes from more than one direction.

01

Knowledge must rule out every possibility of error.

Ordinary knowledge becomes rare: dreams and deception are difficult to rule out completely.

02

Reliable, well-justified belief is enough for knowledge.

Knowledge can survive uncertainty, but merely lucky true belief must still be excluded.

03

Common-sense certainty is more secure than abstract doubt.

The sceptic may be asked why a remote possibility should defeat what we ordinarily know.

Philosophers in the conversation

Different routes through the same problem.

René Descartes

Descartes deliberately withholds assent from anything open to doubt. Dreams and a powerful deceiver unsettle sense experience and reasoning, while the act of thinking appears to survive the test. His method asks whether knowledge can be rebuilt only after a perfectly secure foundation has been found.

David Hume

Hume treats many of our expectations as habits formed by experience, not conclusions reason alone can secure. The world has behaved itself so far; that is not a proof that it will continue to do so. His challenge is less a dramatic deception than the gap between repeated experience and certainty about what must happen next.

G. E. Moore

Moore resists scepticism by beginning with ordinary knowledge: he knows that he has hands and that an external world exists. The dispute is over which claim deserves greater confidence: the familiar judgement or the philosophical premise that seems to undermine it.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein examines the background certainties that make inquiry possible. Some commitments are not conclusions reached from evidence; they are the fixed points around which checking, doubting and giving reasons operate. Universal doubt may therefore remove the very practices that give the word doubt its sense.

Key ideas

Language for thinking more precisely.

Certainty
A belief held so securely that error appears impossible, not merely unlikely.
Scepticism
The challenge that our usual grounds for knowledge may not rule out error.
Justification
The reasons or evidence that make a belief responsibly held.
Infallibilism
The view that knowledge requires grounds that cannot coexist with error.
External world
A reality existing independently of a person's present experience of it.
Cogito
Descartes' claim that thinking establishes the thinker's existence while the thought occurs.

Reconsider your answer

The opening question has changed.

A standard that rules out every sceptical possibility may also rule out nearly every ordinary claim to knowledge. Lower the standard and ordinary knowledge survives; the awkward question is how much risk of error is acceptable.

If certainty is impossible, does knowledge disappear, or have we asked it to do too much?
All inquiries

Progress is a route becoming newly visible.

Related: How can I know that other minds exist?