Why would a good God allow evil?

Moral evil: Suffering or wrongdoing arising from the choices and actions of moral agents.

Natural evil: Suffering associated with disease, disaster or nature rather than deliberate human choice.

Theodicy: An attempt to explain why a good and powerful God permits evil.

Free-will defence: The claim that significant creaturely freedom can justify God's permission of wrongdoing.

Soul-making: The view that challenge and suffering can provide conditions for moral and spiritual growth.

Augustine of Hippo: Augustine treats evil not as a substance created by God but as a privation or corruption of good. Moral evil enters through created wills turning away from proper order. The account protects divine creation while raising further questions about foreknowledge, inherited disorder and natural suffering. Irenaeus and John Hick: The soul-making tradition sees an unfinished, challenging world as an environment in which mature virtues and freely formed relationships can develop. If humans were created in immediate perfection, some valuable growth would be impossible. Critics ask whether the process requires extreme or unequal suffering. J. L. Mackie: Mackie argues that the traditional divine attributes appear inconsistent with evil unless additional beliefs explain why a good, powerful God permits it. He challenges easy free-will replies, especially where divine power seems capable of creating free agents who consistently choose good.

Irenaeus and John Hick: The soul-making tradition sees an unfinished, challenging world as an environment in which mature virtues and freely formed relationships can develop. If humans were created in immediate perfection, some valuable growth would be impossible. Critics ask whether the process requires extreme or unequal suffering. J. L. Mackie: Mackie argues that the traditional divine attributes appear inconsistent with evil unless additional beliefs explain why a good, powerful God permits it. He challenges easy free-will replies, especially where divine power seems capable of creating free agents who consistently choose good. Alvin Plantinga: Plantinga's free-will defence aims to defeat the claim of logical inconsistency. It need not explain the actual reason for every evil; it proposes a possible reason why even an omnipotent God could not guarantee significant freedom and guarantee that creatures never misuse it.

J. L. Mackie: Mackie argues that the traditional divine attributes appear inconsistent with evil unless additional beliefs explain why a good, powerful God permits it. He challenges easy free-will replies, especially where divine power seems capable of creating free agents who consistently choose good. Alvin Plantinga: Plantinga's free-will defence aims to defeat the claim of logical inconsistency. It need not explain the actual reason for every evil; it proposes a possible reason why even an omnipotent God could not guarantee significant freedom and guarantee that creatures never misuse it. Augustine of Hippo: Augustine treats evil not as a substance created by God but as a privation or corruption of good. Moral evil enters through created wills turning away from proper order. The account protects divine creation while raising further questions about foreknowledge, inherited disorder and natural suffering.

A conclusion needs support from the stated reasons. Here, an extra linking premise is required before the consequence follows.

Whether a thinker is likeable does not establish whether their argument is sound. The reasons themselves must be assessed.

The portrait belongs to the named philosopher. Follow the profile link in the feedback to revisit their central move.

The portrait belongs to the named philosopher. Follow the profile link in the feedback to revisit their central move.

The first pair develops “Significant freedom includes the possibility of wrongdoing.”; the second pair applies pressure from the rival position “Difficulty can make courage, compassion and growth possible.”.

The first pair develops “Difficulty can make courage, compassion and growth possible.”; the second pair applies pressure from the rival position “Apparently pointless suffering is evidence against perfect goodness.”.

The first pair develops “Apparently pointless suffering is evidence against perfect goodness.”; the second pair applies pressure from the rival position “Significant freedom includes the possibility of wrongdoing.”.